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Memory and Consciousness
Paula Droege
Pennsylvania State University (USA)
Résumé : Les théories philosophiques de la mémoire font rarement la distinc-
tion entre différents types de mémoire : procédurale, sémantique et épisodique.
Je soutiens une théorie de la représentation temporelle pour expliquer la ca-
ractéristique unique de la mémoire épisodique comme étant la seule forme de
mémoire consciente. Une distinction précise entre représentation implicite et
explicite montre comment le passé figure dans la mémoire. Dans la mémoire
procédurale et sémantique, l’influence du passé est implicite, j’entends par là
que l’expérience passée est utilisée mais pas représentée dans les compétences
ou la connaissance. La mémoire épisodique, à l’inverse, dépend de la représen-
tation d’une expérience passée comme passée. Dans le cadre d’une théorie de
la représentation temporelle de la conscience, un état conscient représente le
moment présent ; et dans le cas d’une mémoire épisodique, cela inclut une re-
présentation de l’expérience passée. L’explication intégrée de la « sensation de
passéité » comprend l’expérience passée comme une partie du contenu explicite
de l’état conscient. Un souvenir épisodique est une représentation du présent
qui inclut une représentation du passé. Tandis qu’une théorie de la conscience
d’ordre supérieur peut ne pas donner de raison expliquant pourquoi seuls les
souvenirs épisodiques sont conscients, une théorie temporelle explique pour-
quoi les souvenirs épisodiques sont à la fois d’ordre supérieur et conscients.
Enfin, je prends en compte le rôle essentiel de la mémoire épisodique dans la
formation d’un soi temporellement étendu. Les exigences d’un environnement
social poussent au développement d’une capacité à suivre les états mentaux des
autres et de soi au fil du temps. En intégrant l’expérience passée (et future)
dans le présent, la mémoire épisodique prolonge l’expérience dans le temps
pour qu’un sens de soi prenne forme. À travers un examen minutieux de la
fonction de représentation temporelle, nous pouvons comprendre pourquoi le
passé n’est pas représenté de manière consciente dans la mémoire procédurale
et sémantique, et la valeur d’une représentation consciente du passé dans la
mémoire épisodique.
Abstract: Philosophical theories of memory rarely distinguish between im-
portantly different sorts of memory: procedural, semantic and episodic. I
Philosophia Scientiæ, 17 (2), 2013, 171–193.
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argue for a temporal representation theory to explain the unique character-
istic of episodic memory as the only form of conscious memory. A careful
distinction between implicit and explicit representation shows how the past
figures in memory. In procedural and semantic memory, the influence of the
past is implicit by which I mean that the past experience is used but not rep-
resented in the skill or knowledge. Episodic memory, in contrast, depends on
representing a past experience as past. On a temporal representation theory
of consciousness, a conscious state represents the present moment, and in the
case of episodic memory, it includes a representation of past experience. The
embedded account of the ‘feeling of pastness’ takes past experience to be part
of the explicit content of a conscious state. An episodic memory is a repre-
sentation of the present that includes a representation of the past. Whereas
a higher-order theory of consciousness can give no reason why only episodic
memories are conscious, a temporal theory explains why episodic memories
are both higher-order and conscious. Finally, I consider the essential role of
episodic memory in the formation of a temporally extended self. The demands
of a social environment motivate development of an ability to track the men-
tal states of others and oneself over time. By incorporating past experience
(and future experience) into the present, episodic memory extends experience
in time to form the sense of self. Through a careful examination of the func-
tion of temporal representation, we can see why the past is not consciously
represented in procedural and semantic memory and the value of consciously
representing the past in episodic memory.
The phenomenologists were right about one thing. An investigation into
the features of the conscious mind should begin with the consideration of how
the mind appears to its bearer. So here are some ways my memories appear
to me (or in the last case, to a famous author):
Though I haven’t ridden a skateboard in years, I remember how
to ride one. Despite a somewhat wobbly start and a far poorer
sense of balance, I am able to push off, glide, turn and stop—this
last rather less than gracefully.
In the course of a long car trip to the Midwest I found myself
spontaneously reciting all the ingredients in a McDonald’s Big
Mac sandwich.
And once I had recognised the taste of the crumb of madeleine
soaked in her decoction of lime-flowers which my aunt used to give
me [...] immediately the old grey house upon the street where her
room was, rose up like the scenery of a theatre to attach itself to
the little pavilion, opening on to the garden, which had been built
out behind it for my parents [...]; and with the house the town,
from morning to night and in all weathers, the Square where I
was sent before luncheon, the streets along which I used to run
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errands, the country roads we took when it was fine. [Proust 1928,
65–66]
What can we say about these different forms of memory and their relation to
consciousness? Drawing on the psychological literature about memory, we can
identify the three types of memory described above as procedural, semantic
and episodic. In all three cases, past experiences influence present action in
some way, even as the form of influence differs. Before I develop the differences
in these cases, a brief note on terminology: While ‘experience’ is often used
interchangeably with ‘consciousness’, it can also be used more generally to
refer to the set of representations that composes the mental state of a person
at a time. Throughout this essay, ‘past experience’ is shorthand for the set of
representations of a person at some time in the past, and ‘sensations, feelings,
thoughts’ are among the sensory and/or conceptual representations that con-
stitute an ‘experience’. As this terminology indicates, the following will offer a
representational account of memory and consciousness, and will discuss their
relation within this frame.
To begin, Section 1 will develop a distinction between implicit and explicit
representation to show how the past figures in all three forms of memory,
and uniquely in episodic memory. In procedural and semantic memory, the
influence of the past is implicit by which I mean that the past experience is
used but not represented in the skill or knowledge. While there must have been
past experiences of skateboard practice and McDonald’s commercials to inform
my abilities, no representation of a past experience is needed to accomplish
the present task. Episodic memory, in contrast, depends on representing a
past experience as past. Proust explicitly recalls the event of drinking tea at
the home of his aunt in Combray.
Characterizing episodic memory as the explicit representation of past ex-
perience solves puzzles about the ‘feeling of pastness’ that accompanies this
form of memory: how is ‘pastness’ represented and why is it consciously rep-
resented? In Section 2, I show how these puzzles are resolved by a temporal
representation theory of consciousness. On this theory, a conscious state rep-
resents the present moment, and in the case of episodic memory, it includes
a representation of past experience. The embedded account of the ‘feeling of
pastness’ takes past experience to be part of the explicit content of a conscious
state. An episodic memory is a representation of the present that includes a
representation of the past.
Since episodic memory exhibits a higher-order representational structure
on this account, one might be tempted to explain the coincidence of con-
sciousness and higher-order representation in episodic memory by invoking
a higher-order theory of consciousness. This impulse would prove unhelpful,
however, as higher-order theory does not explain why both representations of
current and past experiences are conscious in episodic memory. Section 3,
considers and rejects the higher-order thought theory of consciousness in favor
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of a temporal theory. A representation of past experience as past is the reason
episodic memories are higher-order and conscious.
Section 4 concludes by considering the essential role of episodic memory
in the formation of a temporally extended self. The demands of a social en-
vironment motivate development of an ability to track the mental states of
others and oneself over time. By incorporating past experience (and future
experience) into the present, episodic memory extends experience in time to
form the sense of self. Through a careful examination of the function of tem-
poral representation, we can see why the past is not consciously represented
in procedural and semantic memory and the value of consciously representing
the past in episodic memory.
1 The nature of memory
The three cases of memory above utilize very different sorts of abilities, from
bodily, habit-based schemas to highly sophisticated semantic and cognitive
skills. What feature do they have in common that makes them memories?
An obvious initial suggestion is to point to the role of past experience in the
success of present behavior. In Analysis of Mind Bertrand Russell calls this
mnemic phenomena, where current action “can only be brought under causal
laws by including past occurrences in the history of the organism as part of
the causes of the present response” [Russell 1921, 55]. This rough first pass
usefully highlights the fundamental relation between memory and learning.
When I learned to ride a skateboard in 6th grade, I refined my senso-
rimotor coordination over the course of many days and months of practice.
Neurobiological patterns of perception–action sequences developed to speed
reaction times and expand my repertoire of skills. I learned to adjust to dif-
ferent grades and slopes of terrain, although I never mastered jumps or flips.
Already in 6th grade, the development of my skateboarding abilities exempli-
fied procedural memory. From simple stimulus–response conditioning to the
intricate dexterity of fine artisans, procedural memory is the most basic and
widely utilized form of memory. The deep and enduring physiological basis of
procedural memory is dramatically exhibited in cases where an ability is tested
after a long period of disuse, such as my recent adventure with a skateboard.
Though hardly as proficient as I once was, I retain a general sense of how to
ride and could regain my proficiency far more quickly the second time around.
Skills like skateboarding count as a form of memory, because past experiences
are necessary to the success of present actions.
Semantic memory similarly involves the effect of past experiences on
present performance. Though the name suggests language and communica-
tion abilities, this type of memory includes the retention of any facts that
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could be expressed by a proposition with a that clause.1 In semantic memory,
information learned at an earlier time is recalled for current use. For exam-
ple, my perfect recitation of sandwich ingredients displays a well-established
semantic memory for this information. The long period between the time I
learned this information and my surprising recitation makes this a particularly
dramatic (and somewhat disturbing) example of the effect on present action
from past experience.
The standard taxonomy of memory by psychologists classifies procedural
memory as ‘implicit’ or ‘non-declarative’ because the bearer does not recall
specific information. Past training is utilized in present abilities but no infor-
mation about what is remembered can be identified or ‘declared’. Semantic
memory is categorized as ‘explicit’ (or ‘declarative’) because the bearer is able
to state the specific information remembered. Here, I declare, are the ingre-
dients for the Big Mac. However, this way of distinguishing between explicit
and implicit memory becomes blurred if we think of linguistic ability as a skill
[Millikan 2000, chap. 4]. When I recite Big Mac ingredients, I utilize past train-
ing in a way very similar to my use of skateboard training; I simply produce
the appropriate words without reference to a past learning event. Likewise,
procedural memory need not be entirely skill-based. In skateboarding I occa-
sionally rely on a specific rule like ‘lean into a turn’ to formalize particularly
important or tricky procedures. I might even say this rule aloud to reinforce
its effect. One could save the standard explicit/implicit distinction by not-
ing that both procedural and semantic memory may be involved in any given
activity, but further complications soon arise to motivate a new distinction
between explicit and implicit representation in memory.
Of particular concern for the present topic, the notion of ‘explicit’ memory
is often conflated with ‘conscious’ memory, which is sometimes also conflated
with ‘intentionally recalled’ memory.2 In an early discussion of implicit mem-
ory, Daniel Schacter suggests that the explicit/implicit distinction is less am-
biguous and misleading than the conscious/non-conscious distinction [Schacter
1987]. As these things often go, Schacter’s efforts were in vain and the ambi-
guity of ‘consciousness’ continues to infect memory research to the detriment
of both concepts of consciousness and of explicit representation. One of the
goals of this essay is to sort through some of these ambiguities to delineate
useful distinctions between explicit/implicit and conscious/non-conscious.
1. Sven Bernecker takes semantic memory to include any knowledge about the
world, concepts, rules, and language and may even be extended to include non-
conceptual content [Bernecker 2010]. (See his discussion of [Martin 1992] in chap-
ter 1.) Tyler Burge includes both propositional and nonpropositional content in his
description of ‘substantive content memory’ [Burge 2003].
2. In his review of implicit memory theory, Daniel Schacter identifies ‘explicit’ with
‘conscious’ and ‘implicit’ with ‘unconscious’ [Schacter 1987]. Larry Jacoby advocates
an identification of explicit, conscious and intentional (or controlled) memory [Jacoby
1991]. For a review of the history of episodic memory that notes its connection to
consciousness, see [Tulving 2002].
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As a start, take explicit representation to be an item that has the function
of covarying with the item it represents, because this isomorphic relation has
been successful to the organism in the past. Implicit representation also varies
isomorphically with its represented object, but it does so because this relation
facilitates explicit representation in some way. In other words, the distinction
between explicit and implicit representation is determined by a difference in
functional value.3 A spatial example might help illustrate the point. In order
to reach for the cup on my desk, my visual system must explicitly represent the
distance and angle from hand to cup; the functional value of the distance and
angle representations is to get the hand to the cup, because this representation
will get me something to drink. Additionally, my visual system must implicitly
represent my head and arm position, because these factors are relevant to the
successful representation of distance and angle. If as it happens I am hanging
upside-down in my office, a different physical movement will be required to
bridge the distance between hand and cup than if I am sitting comfortably
in my chair. Implicit representations earn their keep by aiding the success of
explicit representations, which in turn are reproduced by their contribution to
the survival of the organism.
With this distinction in place, the peculiar role of past experience in
episodic memory becomes clear. While past experience is represented explic-
itly in episodic memory, it is represented implicitly in procedural and semantic
memory. Consider the similarity in the ways procedural and semantic memory
utilize the past. Both forms of memory are purely present-tense oriented—
skills and information are brought to bear on the current task. Past training
is essential to correct execution of a skill or semantic task, but the past experi-
ences themselves are not represented. Typing is a good example of an activity
that seamlessly combines procedural and semantic memory. As my fingers find
their way to the appropriate keys on the keyboard and the words collect them-
selves into sentences, the success of the sentences I produce depends on past
associations between finger movement and keyboard letter as well as a long
education in concepts and their relations. The past is implicitly represented
in my language production by virtue of its role in facilitating present action.
Failures best demonstrate the important supporting role of past experience
on present explicit representation. On the German keyboard, the positions of
the ‘z’ and ‘y’ are the reverse of the English keyboard. To be successful us-
3. The teleological theory of representation that informs this account follows
Millikan [Millikan 1984, 1993, 2004]. I extend Millikan’s teleosemantic theory to tem-
poral representation and consciousness [Droege 2009]. See [Dienes & Perner 1999]
and [O’Brien & Opie 1999] for alternative descriptions of the distinction between
explicit and implicit representation. While there are interesting threads of similarity
in our descriptions, there are important differences as well. Dienes and Perner, for
example, offer a similar distinction but focus exclusively on knowledge. My concern
is more broad, including perceptual object tracking, effective social interaction and
any number of other functions that might involve explicit and implicit representation.
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ing the German keyboard for typing English,4 my typing movements need to
explicitly represent the correct relation of my finger to the appropriate key.
However, as anyone knows who has ever tried to retrain a previously acquired
skill, implicit representations of past experience on an English keyboard con-
tinually obstruct my ability to explicitly represent the position of the ‘z’ and
‘y’ on a German keyboard. Though present skill-based performance does not
have the function of varying according to past experience—its function is to
vary according to the position of the keys in front of me—the success of the skill
depends on my ability to utilize past experiences on the German rather than
the English keyboard. When the wrong (i.e., English) keyboard experiences
inform my action, then I fail to hit the correct key.
A parallel story about failed semantic memory can be told by substituting
past linguistic and conceptual training for past keyboard training. My seman-
tic representations function successfully by varying in accord with the states
of affairs represented, and past learning experiences are crucial to this func-
tion. Causal theories of knowledge rely on the relation between present belief
and past experience to satisfy the justification requirement in the traditional
analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. Present beliefs are justified when
informed by past learning and fail when they are not appropriately correlated
with past experience. For example, I may conflate my Middle East geography
lessons and falsely believe that Baghdad is the capital of Syria, and Damascus
is the capital of Iraq.5 My semantic representations fail to accord with past
learning (presuming the original instruction was correct), and so an essential
condition for successful representation is not met. Nonetheless, the represen-
tation is implicit because its function is to facilitate current representation,
not to represent the past experience per se. The current relation between cap-
itals and countries is what I need to represent explicitly, not my experience of
learning this information. This is why the appropriate relation to past expe-
rience satisfies only the justification requirement for knowledge, not the truth
requirement. In terms of knowledge, the functional value of explicit seman-
tic representation can be assessed by its capacity to produce truth and the
functional value of implicit semantic representation by its capacity to provide
justification.
As important as past experience is to the success of present semantic repre-
sentation, it is equally important that it remains implicit rather than explicit.
If every knowledge state triggered the explicit representation of past learn-
4. Though I don’t recommend this as standard practice, I do recommend a visiting
lectureship in Germany where typing on German keyboards may be required. Sincere
thanks to the Berlin School of Mind and Brain and the DAAD for giving me the
opportunity to discover this example.
5. Not all semantic memory errors are explained by failures of implicit representa-
tion. I may simply fail to remember anything at all or I may invent a name. However,
any invented name necessarily draws on some semantic memory or a combination of
them, so there may be no clear line between a simple failure of explicit semantic
representation and a failure to draw on the appropriate implicit representations.
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ing experiences, the result would be severely debilitating. The extraordinary
memory of Jill Price poignantly illustrates this consequence. For Price, each
procedural or semantic memory initiates a cascade of the episodic memories
associated with the action or information:
At any given moment, anything at all that someone said to me,
or some hurtful or ridiculous thing that I said to someone that I
desperately wish I could take back, may pop into my mind and
yank me back to that difficult day and exactly how I was feeling
about myself. The emotional intensity of my memories, combined
with the random nature in which they’re always flashing through
my mind, has, on and off through the course of my life, nearly
driven me mad. [Price 2008, 38], quoted in [Bernecker 2010, 2]
While there is a clear value to implicit representation of past experiences
in procedural and semantic memory, what might be the value of explicitly
representing the past? A considerable amount of work is required before we
answer this question in Section 4. For one thing, we need a better sense of
what explicit representation of past experience involves and how it is related to
episodic memory. In his original definition, Endel Tulving identified the spe-
cific content of what, where and when a particular event (episode) occurred as
the marker of episodic memory [Tulving 1972]. As the heyday of behaviorism
waned and the interior of the mind became acceptable to the scientific study
of psychology again, Tulving added a phenomenological condition: in episodic
memory the subject ‘re-experiences’ the past event [Tulving 1983, 2002]. It
is this unique phenomenological requirement that sets episodic memory apart
and will help clarify the relation between consciousness and explicit represen-
tation of past experience.
Consider a non-pathological case where procedural memory generates an
episodic memory. As I casually type these words I do not explicitly represent
my experiences as a high school and college student when I painstakingly
learned this skill. But then, once I begin thinking about my earlier typing
experiences, they suddenly come rushing back to me with each stroke. I recall
searching for the bumps on the F and J key, and staring intently at the blank
chalkboard to force tactile rather than visual navigation of the keyboard. I
picture my college dorm room as I slowly peck away at the words of my essay
while my roommate chides my clumsy efforts. Though procedural memories
represent past experience implicitly by relying on the practice that formed the
skill, sensory or cognitive cues may prompt the explicit representation of the
past experience on which a skill—or concept or belief, in the case of semantic
memory—is based.
In contrast to procedural and semantic memory, episodic memory involves
the explicit representation of past experience, because the functional value of
the representation is determined by its accord with just that experience. In
typing, my skill depends on the appropriate past experience, but the goal is to
represent the position of the keys and the concepts in a sentence. In episodic
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memory, the goal is to represent the past experience itself. The next question
is: how does memory represent the past as past (Section 2)? Followed by:
why is this sort of memory conscious (Section 3)? Finally: what function is
fulfilled by an explicit representation of past experience (Section 4)?
2 How to represent the past
Early in the 20th century, Bertrand Russell recognized the peculiar role of
episodic memory as an explicit representation of the past. Of course, he did
not use this contemporary terminology. Here is his distinction between two
forms of memory—perception and recollection:
What is called perception differs from sensation by the fact
that the sensational ingredients bring up habitual associates—
images and expectations of their usual correlates—all of which
are subjectively indistinguishable from the sensation. The FACT
of past experience is essential in producing this filling-out of
sensation, but not the RECOLLECTION of past experience.
[Russell 1921, 107]
In recollection as opposed to perception, a ‘memory image’ or copy of the
past experience accompanies present sensation. As Russell astutely observed,
the problem is that the memory image is not logically connected to the past
experience that it is supposed to copy. To secure this connection the image
must be accompanied by the belief that ‘this existed’, where ‘this’ refers to the
content of the image, and ‘existed’ refers to a combined feeling of pastness with
a feeling of reality [Russell 1921, 125–126]. Recollection, therefore, is a case
of a direct reference to the past experience by means of the memory image.
It may seem this must be a case of indirect reference with the memory image
as a mediating representation. But for Russell, the memory image is a copy
of the past sensation and so one is directly acquainted with the past when
experiencing an image directly caused by the past.6 The accompanying belief
that ‘this existed’ asserts what the image presents, that one is acquainted with
an actual past experience.
Russell’s goal in this analysis was to account for memory with a spare
ontology composed only of sensations and images, and its virtue is in captur-
ing the sense that one is ‘re-experiencing’ the past events themselves. The
Russellian way to read Proust’s example transports the narrator back in time
as if he were again seeing the town of Combray where he had spent many
summer days. But this is implausible. Despite the rich experience of a vivid
6. For Russell, sensations are not representations of external phenomena, they are
the metaphysical constituents of both mental and physical objects. Consequently, one
can be as directly acquainted with the images that constitute one’s past experience
as those that, along with sensations, constitute one’s present experience.
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memory such as Proust describes, even he admits a more tenuous connection
to the past event, noting the fragile quality of memory, its uncertainty and
its inventiveness [Proust 1928, 63]. While our beliefs about past and future,
reality and fiction do differ, these differences beg explanation rather than offer
it. Why are some images accompanied by a belief that ‘this existed’, and what
determines when that belief is appropriately applied? In particular, Russell of-
fers no account of the ‘feeling of pastness’ essential to episodic memory. Given
that memories are a constructive and fallible affair, a full account of memory
must show how a feeling of pastness comes to be attached to an image and
when that feeling accurately signifies the appropriate causal relation between
the past event and the current image. Even in cases where a person has a
detailed recollection of specific features of an event, errors of omission, addi-
tion or various combinations of features are likely.7 The features we remember
from an event will be those that resonate in some way with the present situ-
ation, either due to a cue like Proust’s tea and madeleine cakes or due to the
relevance of a past event to current action. Details from the past are selected
and combined to serve functions that rarely depend on a precise reproduction
of the past event.
Another reason to think episodic memory is not a matter of directly ex-
periencing a past event comes from the phenomenology of episodic memory.
Memories don’t transport us into the past; they don’t even make us feel trans-
ported into the past, at least I do not feel transported in this way.8 My episodic
memories seem rather to bring the past into the present. My spatio-temporal
location does not shift so much as multiply, adding the sensations, feelings and
thoughts from the past event to those of the present. This feature of inclusion
in the present is, I maintain, why episodic memory is the only form of con-
scious memory. On my view, conscious states are composed of representations
of the world9 at the present moment, and embedded within a representation
of what is present are the sensations, feelings and thoughts that represent the
past. So, for example, Proust’s memory is the representation of the present
moment on a winter’s day, which includes sensory representations of the taste
of tea and madeleines, and in addition, it includes representations of his past
summertime experiences in Combray. Though it may be romantic to think
7. Psychologist Ulrich Neisser compared the remarkably detailed testimony of
John Dean, former counsel to President Nixon, to tape recordings of the same events
[Neisser 1981]. While Dean accurately recounted the general narrative structure of
events, his testimony misattributes details of one event to another and confabulates
statements of participants (Discussed in [Martin 2001], see also [Schacter & Addis
2007], [Dudai & Carruthers 2005]).
8. Others might feel differently. Phenomenological accounts face a difficult chal-
lenge when sincere first-person reports fundamentally differ. For more on this issue,
see note 12.
9. I include both internal and external aspects of the ‘world’. Moods, thoughts,
and bodily sensations such as pains can be represented in consciousness, as well as
trees, friends and sunsets.
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of ourselves as revisiting the past through episodic memory, a more plausible
account is that we bring representations of the past into the present.
How might this work? Like Proust, I sit firmly entrenched in the present,
with my desk, computer and coffee before me. We can schematize this repre-
sentational moment in the following way:
{now, here} → <10:12:33, office, desk, computer, coffee>
The { } brackets indicate indexicals, and the → arrow maps the indexical
function from context to its representational content. <> symbols mark the
content so mapped. Since I am relying on my own, perhaps unfamiliar, theory
of consciousness, let me expand on this analysis a bit. The items indicated in
<> are the representational contents that compose my conscious state. What
makes these representations conscious, as opposed to the many other mental
representations occurring unconsciously, is that these fulfill the function of a
conscious state to represent the present moment. Conscious representations
are the best approximation of the world now.10
To include a memory in the frame of this conscious representational mo-
ment we need to embed a representation of a past experience generated in
Proustian fashion from a sip of my coffee. Suddenly, the tiny country house
of my graduate school years in Connecticut appears before me, a fire ablaze
in the hearth, my copy of Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories
lying neglected on my lap; the cat curls cozily on the chair beside me, snowy
garden and woods beyond. To capture the temporal complexity of this rep-
resentation requires a schema that somehow incorporates this past experience
into the present. Consider the following:
{now, here} → <10:15:12, office, desk, coffee, [past experience]>
where [past experience] = [{past, there} → <sometime in the
mid-1990s, Storrs, fire, book, cat>]
In this schema, the [ ] brackets indicate representational content from the past
experience as embedded in my representation of the present moment.11 The
structure is higher-order; a representational state from the past is represented
as part of the content of the represented present.12 In the next section, I
will consider whether this higher-order representational structure casts any
10. For a fully developed argument in favor of this view, see [Droege 2009, 2003].
11. There may be a need to include self-reference so as to identify the memory as
mine. It would be fairly easy to add another indexical if one belongs, but I am not
convinced that memories are necessarily self-identifying.
12. In the case where one feels transported into the past, the indexical indica-
tor for {now, here} would map the representational contents from the past event.
Such a representation would not be higher-order, nor would there be a ‘feeling of
pastness’. Phenomenologically, the experience misrepresents the past event as now.
Such a person might know the event is past—as when a lucid dreamer knows she
is dreaming—but the experience is represented as present on the direct perception
account.
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light on why episodic memories are conscious, though procedural and semantic
memories are not.
Before we move on to the relation of episodic memory to consciousness,
a potential objection from Mohan Matthen needs to be addressed [Matthen
2010]. Matthen has argued that pastness cannot be part of the content of
an episodic memory because episodic content is imagistic. Since an image
cannot look as if it is causally descended from a previous experience, temporal
content cannot be part of the experience as represented. Instead, Matthen
takes pastness to be a cognitive feeling that functions as a way of entertaining
the episodic image. The temporal marker serves as an adverbial modification
of a propositional attitude—I experience pastly: sitting by the fire, etc.
There are two problems with this analysis that highlight the advantages
of an embedded representational account. First, Matthen’s account treats the
content of episodic memory as indistinguishable from perceptual content, yet
denies that the similarity between these forms of content is a matter of the
preservation of content from one state to the next. According to Matthen,
what is preserved in memory is a trace or engram that is retained subper-
sonally and then later “entertained” as a memory by means of the episodic
operator ‘experiences pastly’ [Matthen 2010, 11]. The trace functions as a
kind of rock in the brain; it sits quietly until called upon to serve as the “cat-
egorical basis” for memory construction [Matthen 2010, 7]. But how does the
brain manage to distinguish one trace as the basis for my memory of lunch
yesterday from another trace that is my memory of my 6th birthday if the
difference is not determined by the representational content of these two vehi-
cles? This mysterious meat-to-memory process has the aura of alchemy when
severed from a representational theory. It may be that Matthen objects to a
particular notion of representational content as a data file that can be stored
and accessed without modification at a later date.13 If so, he may be amenable
to a teleosemantic view of memory where the function of representing the past
determines the representational content preserved in memory.
Even if we agree about the representational content of memory, the second
problem with Matthen’s analysis of pastness as a cognitive feeling is that it
describes rather than explains the phenomenon. We can ask the same ques-
tions we put to Russell: why are only some images accompanied by the feeling
of pastness, and what determines whether this feeling is appropriate or not?
Some connection between the feeling of pastness and the fact that the event
represented really was an event in one’s own past is needed to explain where
the feeling of pastness comes from and in what way it is useful.
13. His target is Tyler Burge’s description of ‘purely preservative memory’ [Burge
2003]. It is worth noting that Burge distinguishes this type of memory from ‘experien-
tial memory’ which he takes to “introduce new subject matter into current thinking”
[Burge 2003, 289]. Consequently, it is unclear whether the argument applies to expe-
riential memory.
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Matthen can again offer a functional account of cognitive feeling such that
it is designed to entertain images from one’s past. But if this is the response,
then an embedded representational account is essentially similar and far sim-
pler. On an embedded account, representational relations explain similarities
and differences in content between conscious perception and episodic memory,
and why ‘pastness’ is a content attached to the latter, while ‘presentness’ is
a content attached to the former. Starting with ‘presentness’, we can think
of conscious perception as a representation of the present moment, designed
to indicate current conditions that enable the creature to plan future action
in light of past progress toward its goals [Droege 2003, 2009]. On this view,
consciousness represents the present explicitly and the past implicitly when
utilizing procedural and semantic memory. Temporal representation is en-
tirely present-tense oriented. Past and future are not conceived abstractly as
temporal moments independent of present action; they are distinguished from
the present in purely relational terms. In contrast, we can think of episodic
memory as an explicit representation of the past. Its functional value is rooted
in its representation of a past experience itself, that is, a representation of the
past as past. By interpreting the ‘feeling of pastness’ in terms of explicit tem-
poral content, we can explain why memories are supposed to be similar to
the experiences they reproduce—their function is to vary in accord with those
experiences—and also why they may fail to fulfill that function and still count
as ‘memories’.
Given the unspecific and reconstructive character of memory, the past ex-
perience represented may be composed of several events from an indeterminate
span of time. In regard to the memory described above, there may not have
been a single event where fire, cat, chair, and book were combined. Certainly I
experienced all of these elements in various combinations, but I could not say
for certain that there is a single episode of what, where, when that the memory
references. Nor need there have been. Though episodic memory got its name
as a type of memory for determinate ‘episodes’, there is good reason to think
that the function of representing past events, even the explicit representation
of past events, is a more flexible operation than the traditional description
suggests.14
14. Though ‘memory’ is often taken to be a success word, contemporary research
suggests that such a characterization would restrict the category of memory quite
severely, perhaps to nothing. Moreover, from the first-person perspective we are
unable to distinguish memories that are perfectly accurate about the past from those
that are false or confabulated in some way. Consequently, all our ‘memories’ would
be suspect, not merely as potentially fallible, but as potentially something other than
a memory. The truth-requirement for ‘memory’ is not worth these costs, in my view.
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3 Consciousness and representation of the
past
The previous section proposed a theory of the pastness in episodic memory
in terms of an explicit representation of past experience embedded in a rep-
resentation of the present. The next question is why episodic memories are
the only sort of memory that is conscious. It is certainly possible to explicitly
represent a past experience without consciously re-experiencing its features.
While an embedded account can explain the attribution of pastness to the rep-
resentation of past experience, something more is needed to explain why the
past should be represented consciously. In procedural and semantic memory,
the past experiences utilized in present action remain unconscious. I do not
consciously re-experience my past when skateboarding, reciting hamburger
ingredients or typing essays. Only in episodic memory do I consciously re-
experience the past.
Not coincidentally, a higher-order structure is also unique to episodic mem-
ory. As argued earlier, I do not represent past experiences in my exercise
of a skill, even though past experiences are necessary to have formed the
skill. Habits of action are encoded in the nervous system precisely in order
to circumvent deliberative mental processes that slow reaction time. Explicit
representation of past experiences and reasoning about those representations
would add an unreasonable computational burden to an otherwise smoothly
functional machine. For similar reasons, my spontaneous production of the
words to the McDonald’s jingle need not be accompanied by a representation
of the past experience when these words were learned. For procedural and
semantic forms of memory, first-order representation of the appropriate infor-
mation is sufficient. Of course, some semantic memories are clearly higher-
order, such the thought that I have been thinking about memory all week.
I will consider these cases in Section 4 in relation to the function of episodic
memory and other higher-order states. My point here is that these forms of
memory are not necessarily, nor I would say, usually higher-order. Episodic
memory, by contrast, necessarily has a higher-order structure on my account;
it is an embedded representation of past experience within the current repre-
sentational state.
That is, conscious episodic memory is necessarily higher-order. One might
wonder whether it is possible for episodic memories to be unconscious. Prior
to retrieval, the material for constructing my 6th birthday memory presumably
exists in the form of unconscious representations, the content of which is pre-
served from the time of my birthday experiences, or so I argued in Section 2.
If we consider this representational content an unconscious episodic memory,
it would not be higher-order; it would simply be the set of sensations, feelings
and thoughts that represent my 6th birthday.15 When conscious, my represen-
15. Even so, what makes this form of memory unique is the ‘conscious re-
experiencing of the past’ noted in Tulving’s definition [Tulving 1983, 2002]. So,
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tation of the present represents these representations, and they are therefore
higher-order.
This coincidence of consciousness and higher-order structure as unique
to episodic memory might lead one to a higher-order representational the-
ory of consciousness in a search for explanation. According to higher-order
theory, a state is conscious when there is an appropriate sort of higher-order
representation of it. Higher-order theorists differ on what sort of represen-
tation is the appropriate sort—thought or sensation, intrinsic or relational,
assertoric or dispositional. For the purposes of argument, I will consider the
clearly-structured higher-order thought theory, defended by David Rosenthal
[Rosenthal 1993, 1997, 2004], to show that the coincidence between metarepre-
sentational states and consciousness in episodic memory does not lend support
to higher-order theories.
According to Rosenthal, a mental state is conscious when there is a higher-
order thought (HOT) about it [Rosenthal 1997, 737]. Following this account,
a particular type of HOT could mark representations as past in a way similar
to the embedded account given above. As I sit here at my desk reminiscing
about my graduate student days, I may have a thought with the content:
I remember that I sat by the fire with a book on my lap and the
cat nearby.
Because the past experience forms the content of the higher-order thought, this
mental state is conscious. The type of higher-order thought—remembering—
includes the temporal content that the experience occurred at some time in
the past.16 This simple explanation in addition to the fact that episodic mem-
ories are the only form of memory that is necessarily conscious and necessarily
higher-order seems to be good support for the higher-order theory of con-
sciousness. When memories are unconscious—either because they are proce-
dural or semantic, or because they are dormant episodic memories—they lack
higher-order structure. If a state is only conscious when there is a higher-order
thought about it, the coincidence of episodic memory, higher-order structure
and consciousness is just what one would expect.
The problem with this explanation can again be found in the phenomenol-
ogy of episodic memory. As mentioned earlier, no memory transports us
to a past event; we always continue to experience our current environment
while simultaneously experiencing remembered sensations and thoughts. So,
where not otherwise noted, ‘episodic memory’ refers to conscious representations of
past experience. Thanks to David Pereplyotchik and David Rosenthal for pressing
me to clarify this point.
16. A higher-order thought theorist could also adopt Matthen’s adverbial approach
and analyze the type of HOT as ‘thinking pastly’. Matthen would likely object
to the metacognitive account, however, as failing to explain the feeling of pastness
that accompanies the representation of the event [Matthen 2010, 10]. For his part,
Rosenthal would probably also resist the inner sensory cast of Matthen’s ‘cognitive
feelings’.
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in addition to the clearly higher-order structure of episodic memory, we simul-
taneously have first-order conscious states about things we are experiencing
right here and now. These first-order conscious states can be easily accounted
for by higher-order thought theory as sensory states of which we are con-
scious by virtue of higher-order thoughts. But now we are reminded of the
fact that the higher-order thoughts by virtue of which mental states are con-
scious are not themselves conscious. For a HOT to be conscious requires a
yet higher-order thought (HOT2) to take that HOT as its content [Rosenthal
1997, 745]. Episodic memories are higher-order in the sense that past mental
states are represented by current mental states, both of which are conscious.
The higher-order structure of episodic memories occurs within consciousness,
so the higher-order structure cannot without circularity explain the fact that
episodic memories are conscious. Consequently, a yet higher-order thought
would be needed to explain conscious episodic memory, removing the illusion
that the coincidence between the higher-order structure of episodic memory
and its uniqueness as the only conscious form of memory is a reason to adopt
a higher-order account of consciousness. Nor does the theory explain why the
higher-order structure of episodic memory is conscious. Consistent with HOT
theory is the possibility that episodic memory could just as well have remained
unconscious, like procedural and semantic memory, informing about the past
without explicitly representing the past. Or the present moment might have
disappeared from conscious content entirely in the way memory is depicted
in films—the screen blurs and the past replaces the present as the content
of the image. There are certainly explanations consistent with the higher-
order thought theory, but they are not supplied by the theory. Therefore,
the coincidence between the higher-order structure of episodic memory and
its consciousness does not in itself support the higher-order thought theory of
consciousness.17
In contrast, the fact that episodic memory is included in a representation of
the present moment as an explicit representation of a past experience explains
both its higher-order structure and its consciousness on a temporal represen-
tation theory. We explicitly represent both the present moment and the past
when we have a conscious episodic memory. Conscious states represent the
present moment, which, as just noted, includes an explicit representation of
the past. Because this representation of the past is included in the represen-
17. Other forms of higher-order theory do not fare better, which is perhaps why
memory appears rarely, if ever, in arguments for higher-order theory. The excep-
tion is Rocco Gennaro, who uses episodic memory as an argument for his version
of higher-order thought theory [Gennaro 1992, 1996]. However, the argument relies
on the conflation of episodic memory with short-term or working memory. While
consciousness does indeed depend on a temporally extended or ‘specious’ present,
there is no reason to believe that the specious present depends on an explicit con-
cept of the past which is required for episodic memory. Therefore, the inference
from the higher-order structure of episodic memory to consciousness fails in this
argument as well.
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tational content of the present moment, it is necessarily conscious and the
structure of the episodic memory is higher-order.
Thus, an explanation of several facets of episodic memory falls out of a
theory of consciousness described in terms of temporal representation. An
analysis of memory as a representation of the past links procedural, semantic
and episodic memory together, while the distinction between implicit and ex-
plicit representation of the past accounts for the ‘feeling of pastness’ unique
to episodic memory. Given the capacity of implicit forms of memory to ef-
fectively inform many complex behaviors, the next question is what function
explicit representation of the past in episodic memory might serve in human
experience.
4 Why episodic memory might be useful
Speculation on the functional value of a mental attribute such as episodic
memory is properly the purview of psychology, and I will draw on some of this
work in the following. In addition, armchair philosophical analysis highlights
ways in which episodic memory forms the basis for a sense of self over time.
As we will see, empirical and philosophical discussions converge to tell a story
about the essential role of episodic memory in the emergence of a temporally
extended self. Three strands of research connect the need to anticipate the
actions of others in a social environment as an evolutionary incentive for a
theory of mind, the representation of one’s own experience over time, and the
development of a unified self. Let me begin with a just-so story from Nicholas
Humphrey about the origins of the ability to track the mental states of others
and oneself [Humphrey 1983].
In the beginning there were creatures capable of sensation and intelligent
action, but without the ability to monitor their own states. Over the course
of time some of these creatures discovered that forming social groups could be
useful in defending themselves against predators, finding food, and generally
having fun. One problem with being social, though, is that other creatures can
be unpredictable. Suddenly one guy gets angry or another starts acting silly,
and it is hard to understand why. To try to reduce some of this uncertainty,
some of the creatures started to keep track of how different members of the
group responded to different events in order to better anticipate what causes
would bring on what sort of behavior from whom. After awhile these clever
creatures—which Humphrey calls ‘nature’s psychologists’—realized they could
apply these same tracking abilities to their own reactions in order to under-
stand themselves better.
Stories such as this one cannot be definitively proven, but the basic connec-
tion between social interaction and mind-reading skills is fairly uncontrover-
sial. Disagreements arise over how social interaction drives the development
of these skills—through simulation, a theory theory or a theory of rationality
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[Goldman 2006]. More controversial may be the claim that the capacity for
reading other minds is the source of our own self-conscious reflection. One
might be inclined to think, for example, that self-consciousness is more basic,
and mind-reading is matter of inferring to others on the basis of one’s own case.
Though this view problematically makes self-consciousness inexplicable, it is
nonetheless compatible with the point I want to make about episodic memory.
Even if one is conscious of one’s own states prior to the ability to interpret
the mental states of others, there is no reason to keep track of mental states
without the driver of social pressure. In the context of a group, a creature
needs to be aware of and appropriately manage her own mental states, as well
as the mental states of others to whatever extent she can. The desert island
dweller has no use for self-reflection, because there is no value in tracking her
own states. Without an Other to react well or badly as a consequence of a
happy smile or angry outburst, the mental states that generate these behav-
iors can occur unregulated. One merely needs to act on one’s fears and desires
appropriately; there is no need to represent them as well. In a social environ-
ment, on the other hand, self-monitoring becomes crucial, either initiating the
development of self-conscious reflection or activating an innate capacity.
Episodic memory is a critical component of self-conscious reflection be-
cause it connects past, present and future experiences. Past experiences are
incorporated into a representation of the present, according to the embedded
account of episodic memory proposed above. A single conscious state includes
representations of both present and past events, generating a link between ex-
periences represented as occurring at distinct times. Episodic memory brings
the past forward into direct contact with the present. Make no mistake, this
is a representational theory, not an acquaintance theory. Nonetheless, the in-
tuitive appeal of acquaintance can be accounted for by the fact that past and
present experience are included in the same representational state.
Representations of future experiences may also be formed on the basis of
episodic memories, according to recent research. Studies of amnesic patients
show that the ability to imagine future events is severely restricted relative to
control subjects, suggesting the capacity to re-experience the past is linked to
the capacity for envisioning the future [Maguire, Vargha-Khadem & Hassabis
2010], [Kwan, Carson, Addis et al. 2010]. Developmental evidence indicates
that ‘episodic future thinking’ emerges with episodic memory between ages 3
and 4 [Atance & O’Neill 2005], and neurophysiological evidence shows that
similar neural systems are engaged in imagining both future and past [Addis,
Pan, Vu et al. 2009], [Okuda, Fujii, Ohtake et al. 2003]. Daniel Schacter and
Donna Addis have suggested that the functional value of episodic memory may
be attributable more to the imagination of future events than the accurate rep-
resentation of the past [Schacter & Addis 2007]. The dual use of memory con-
tents explains the fallible, reconstructive nature of episodic memory. Rather
than function as a video recorder of events, memory representations function
as components for reconstruction of past events as well as flexible combination
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and configuration of hypothetical scenarios.18 If the only function of episodic
memory were to acquaint us with the past, one would expect a much more
efficient system than one influenced by linguistic cues, context and motiva-
tional factors. More plausible is a system designed to project our experiences
in both directions in time. Episodic memories provide the connection to our
experiences in the past as well as the material for anticipating the experiences
we hope to have in the future.
This bi-directional temporal projection of experiences from past to present
to future provides the ground for a spatiotemporally continuous self as the
bearer of a relatively consistent set of experiences over time. John Locke
classically utilized the coincidence of past and present experience in memory
as a criterion for personal identity:
[...] as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any
past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person;
it is the same self now it was then; and it is by the same self with
the present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done.
[Locke 1689, Book II, chap. 27, § 9]
Because my consciousness now includes a consciousness of the past, the
two experiences can be attributed to the same person. This is not to say that
Locke offers the best theory of personal identity; it is simply a recognition of
the compelling power of episodic memory to establish a sense of ourselves over
time. The immediacy of conscious recollection supplies what William James
called the ‘warmth’ that constitutes the feeling of self.19 We need not decide
whether episodic memory grounds personal identity or assumes it to note the
integral relation between them. Episodic memory is certainly an essential tool
for keeping track of oneself as the same self over time.
A spatiotemporally continuous, or temporally extended self, is completely
devastated by the loss of episodic memory and future imagining despite the
retention of semantic memories. Oliver Sacks tells the story of a man with
severe retrograde and anterograde amnesia as a result of Korsakoff’s syndrome
[Sacks 1970]. Because Mr. Thompson has no episodic memories to form his
life, he is driven to confabulate a narrative in a desperate attempt to make
sense of an otherwise meaningless series of events. Sacks describes the case as
a loss of ‘inner drama’:
To be ourselves we must have ourselves—possess, if need be re-
possess, our life-stories. We must ‘recollect’ ourselves, recollect
the inner drama, the narrative, of ourselves. A man needs such
a narrative, a continuous inner narrative to maintain his identity,
his self. [Sacks 1970, 111]
18. The flexible, reconstructive process by which episodic memory consciously rep-
resents the past is further reason to identify its conscious instantiation as definitive
of this form of memory. See note 15.
19. “Remembrance is like direct feeling; its object is suffused with a warmth and
intimacy to which no object of mere conception ever attains” [James 1892, 158].
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Episodic memory supplies the experiential thread that strings the pearls of a
life into the strand of a self. Without the conscious experience of one’s past
and future, the information about oneself forms at best an inferential, third-
person self. One knows oneself in the same way one knows others, as a set of
stories that narrate a character. The ‘warmth’ that James felt as essential to
the self is missing without the conscious representation of time provided by
episodic memory.
Semantic memories, even higher-order ones, cannot provide this experien-
tial link. As noted earlier, many higher-order representations of past experi-
ences do not involve re-experiencing the past. I might think to myself, ‘My
goodness, I have been thinking a lot about memory this week’. My thought
represents my past thoughts about memory. Since my past thoughts about
memory are explicitly represented, it seems to follow on my account that they
are necessarily consciously represented. But clearly they need not be. Note
that in such cases I am not explicitly representing the past experience, I am
explicitly representing the fact that a past experience occurred. The differ-
ence is similar to my episodic memory of walking up the 704 steps of the Eiffel
Tower to my semantic memory of the fact that there are 704 steps from the
ground to the 2nd floor of the Eiffel Tower. Explicit representation of expe-
rience rather than fact is constitutive of episodic memory and the aspect of
memory necessary for a sense of oneself as extended in time.
5 Conclusion
These considerations about the role of episodic memory in grounding a tem-
porally extended self explain why episodic memory is often the only form of
memory philosophers take to be of any interest. Nonetheless, a comparison
of episodic memory with procedural and semantic memory highlights the im-
portance of past experience in all three forms of memory. Episodic memory is
unique in being the only form of memory that explicitly represents the past
and the only form of memory that is conscious. A temporal representation the-
ory of consciousness explains the coincidence of these two features in terms of
an embedded representation of past experience within a representation of the
present moment. When Proust remembers things past, he incorporates them
into his representation of the present to form a nest of temporal experiences
which are the basis for a story of the self.
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